報告書番号

Y95016

タイトル（和文）

プライス・キャップ規制下の料金変動パターン

タイトル（英文）

DYNAMIC PATTERN OF PRICES UNDER PRICE-CAP REGURATION

概要 （図表や脚注は「報告書全文」に掲載しております）

効率的な方式として支持する根強い意見もあるプライス・キャップ規制について，本分析では，数値実験を行なうための料金決定モデルを開発し，これまで静学的な分析で見落とされてきたプラライス・キャップ規制下での電気料金変動パターンを明らかにし，ラムゼイ料金が実現されるかどうかを検証した。このシミュレーションによると，プライス・キャップ規制の下で相対的に価格弾力的な電力需要の料金は大幅に下落するが，逆に電灯料金は高騰し，特に，電力部門に競争者が参入可能である場合には，既存企業は，参入者を駆逐するために電力需要の料金を参入がない場合に比べて顕著に引き下げることが分かった。また，経済効率上，望ましいとされるラムゼイ価格体系はいずれのケースにおいても成立していないことが推察された。

概要 （英文）

GENERALLY, ECONOMISTS ASSERT THAT THE PRICE-CAP REGURATION LEADS TO SECOND-BEST PRICING. HOWEVER, THE PREVIOUS WORKS HAVE NOT BEEN DONE UNDER DYNAMIC CONDITIONS. THEREFORE, THIS PAPER INVESTIGATED THE EFFECTS OF PRICE-CAP REGURATION ON DYNAMIC PATTERNS OF PRICES AND VERIFIED WHETHER THIS TYPE OF REGURATIONS WOULD LEAD TO SECOND-BEST PRICING UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS. WE DEVELOPED AN ECONOMETRIC MODELTHAT SIMULATED BEHAVIOR OF A REGULATED FIRM UNDER PRICE-CAP REGURATIONBASED ON THE OPTIMIZATION THEORY AND CONDUCTED VARIOUS SIMULATIONS, CHANGING PARAMETERS DEGREE OF CONPETITION ETC. THE SIMULATIONS IN THIS REPORT CONSTITUTE OUR MAIN SCENARIOS, AGAINST WHICH SUBSEQUENT EXPERIMENTS SERVED TO ASSESS THE SENSITIVIT Y OF RESULTS WITH RESPECT TO ALTERATIONS IN BEHAVIORAL ASSUMPTIONS AND KEY PARAMETERS. TO CONDUCT SIMULATIONS, WE ASSUMED TWO SCENARIOS CONCERNING A MARKET STRUCTURE. IN THE FIRSTSCENARIO, WE ASSUMED THAT AN INCUMBENT FIRM MAINTAINED MONOPOLISTIC POWER IN BOTH MARKETS:LIGHT SERVICES AND POWER SERVICES, NAMELY THE ENTRYINTO THE BOTH MARKETS WERE RESTRICTED BY A REGULATOR. IN THE SECOND SCENARIO, WE ASSUMED THE EXISTENCE OF A COMPETITOR IN THE POWER SERVICE RESULTING IN THE RESTRICTION OF ENTRY TO THE POWER SERVICE MARKETS BEINGABOLISHED. THE RESULTS OF THE SIMULATIONS ARE AS FOLLWS: (1) IN BOTH SCENARIOS, WE CONFIRMED A DECREASE IN THE PRICE OF POWER SERVICES WITH RELATIVELY-HIGH PRICE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND AND AN INCREASE IN PRICE OF LIGHT SERVICES, BECAUSE THE INCUMBENT FIRM COVERED DEFICITS IN POWER SERVICES BY INCREASING THE PRICE OF LIGHT SERVICES. (2) IN THE SECOND SCNARIO, WE CONJECTURED PREDATORY PRICING BY THE INCUMBENT FIRM FOR COMPETITIVE POWER SERVICES. THE LIGHT-SERVICES CUSTOMERS,THE SO-CALLED CAPTURED CUSTOMERS,INCURRED DISADVANTAGES BECAUSE THE INCUMBENT FIRM CROSS-SUBSIZED THE LIGHT SERVICESWITH RELATIVELY LOW ELASTICITY BY THE POWER SERVICES AT OF ENTRY OF RIVALS INTO THE POWER SERVICES UNDER PRICE-CAP REGULATION. (3) WE DEMONSTRATED THAT RAMSE

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