報告書番号

Y01003

タイトル（和文）

An Empirical Analysis of the Transition to Retail Competition in the U.S.Electricity Industry

タイトル（英文）

An Empirical Analysis of the Transition to Retail Competition in the U.S.Electricity Industry

概要 （図表や脚注は「報告書全文」に掲載しております）

米国では、既に約半数の州で電力の小売自由化法案が可決している一方、残り半数の州では小売自由化に慎重になっており、その有効性について懐疑的な状況が見られる。本報告では、州の小売自由化の決定が米国の既存電気事業者の電気料金、運転保守費用、設備投資行動に及ぼした影響を推計し、小売自由化初期の成果を分析評価した。分析の結果、料金、特に大口産業用については、実際に自由化への移行による引き下げ効果があったといえる。家庭用の料金にも引き下げ効果が見られるが、これは規制当局の義務づけによる部分が大きいと考えられる。一方、運転保守費用に及ぼした影響は明確でなく、小売の自由化によって一層の費用削減があったとはいえない。また、小売自由化の決定で、発電設備への投資は削減されている。これは、自由化に伴う発電と送電の所有分離政策が影響と考えられる。ただし、発電投資の削減は、送配電投資の増加につながっていない。

概要 （英文）

Electric restructuring activity in the U.S. had been accelerating in recent years. Some States implemented full liberalization of the retail market, but other States are becoming more cautious. The clear indication is that a controversy is emerging as to the benefits of retail competition. Although it is too early in the restructuring process to reach concrete judgments, an early empirical evaluation of the effects of retail competition on the U.S. electricity industry will be useful to policy makers by helping them determine the scope and speed of the further liberalization of the industry. This paper empirically evaluates the effects of the transition to competition on the economic performance of U.S. electricity industry. Using panel data for major investor-owned utilities for the period 1992 through 1999 we estimate regression equations for economic performance and behavior in order to test the hypothesis that a transition to retail competition has resulted in the anticipated economic outcomes. We model and evaluate the statistical effect of the transition on price, cost, and investment behavior.Both residential and industrial customers in states undergoing the transition to retail competition enjoy a rate reduction, although the reduction in residential price is more or less a result of an administratively mandated rate reduction. The identified price reduction that we attribute to the transition, however, does not appear to be necessarily associated with any cost reduction induced by an efficiency improvement. Our analysis of investment behavior shows that the traditional utilities undergoing the transition reduced their regulated production investments. This is explained by the disincentive toward such investment that has been created institutionally by state government or state regulators who required or encouraged the unbundling of a vertically integrated utility. We also find reductions of investment in regulated production assets do not necessarily mean that the utilities have shifted their investment resources to regulated transmission and distribution facilities.

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