報告書番号

Y15010

タイトル（和文）

電力市場の競争促進及び活性化に向けた制度的措置の課題

タイトル（英文）

Issues in Regulatory Measures to Promote Competition and to Improve Liquidity in the Liberalized Electricity Market

概要 （図表や脚注は「報告書全文」に掲載しております）

小売電力市場における競争の促進や、そのための卸電力取引の活性化のために、既存の大手電気事業者に求められる制度的措置として、欧州で見られる仮想発電設備（VPP）、フランスの既設原子力発電への規制アクセス制度（ARENH）、イギリスでの先渡し市場におけるマーケットメーカーの義務化を取り上げ、それらの概要と運用実態を明らかにするとともに、わが国で同様の制度的措置の導入を検討せざるを得ない場合に留意すべき点を検討した。このような制度的措置は、中長期的な競争に及ぼす影響を考慮し、いずれも一定期間運用した後に終了して期限や終了させる条件を事前に定めて運用することが望ましい。また、将来的に再生可能エネルギーの大量導入によって卸電力価格が低下すれば、こうした措置が不要となる可能性についても留意すべきである。

概要 （英文）

This report discusses the issues in regulatory measures in liberalized electricity market by imposing some obligation to the incumbent firms to promote competition by helping the new entrants to access to the wholesale power. We examine three such measures: (1) Virtual Power Plant (VPP), also known as Virtual Divestiture, (2) Regulated Access to the Historic Nuclear Power Plants (ARENH) in France, and (3) Market Maker Obligation in the UK. Virtual Power Plants are widely used as regulatory measures to prevent market power of the incumbents or dominant firms created through mergers but only implemented for a limited period of time (less than 10 years) and the capacity affected by VPP is also limited (mostly less than 10%). ARENH determines the price for access by regulation but it would be difficult to establish the appropriate price level. Recently, as the wholesale power prices are decreased, ARENH volume has been decreased. Market Maker obligation is expected to impose some costs on the major suppliers and how they could recover such costs needs to be determined. We argue that these measures should be introduced with caution as they harm competition in the long run. For example, the measures should be implemented for a pre-specified period of time.

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