電力中央研究所

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電力中央研究所 報告書(電力中央研究所報告)

報告書データベース 詳細情報


報告書番号

EY95002

タイトル(和文)

APPLICATION OF INCENTIVE REGULATIONS IN ELECTRICITY SUPPLY INDUSTRY

タイトル(英文)

APPLICATION OF INCENTIVE REGULATIONS IN ELECTRICITY SUPPLY INDUSTRY

概要 (図表や脚注は「報告書全文」に掲載しております)

概要 (英文)

HISTORICALLY,THE TOOL TRADITIONALLY USED BY UTILITY REGULATORS TO RESTRAIN ELECTRICITY RATES HAS BEEN COST-PLUS(RATE-OF-RETURN)REGULATION. EXPERIENCE SHOWS THAT COST-PLUS REGULATION DOESNOT NECESSARILY INDUCE EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENTS IN UTILITY OPERATIONS. IN ORDER TO IMPROVE EFFICIENCY IN NON-COMPETITIVE MARKETS,INCENTIVE MECHANISMS HAVE BEEN DESIGNED TO REPLACE TRADITIONAL COST-PLUS REGULATION.IT CAN NOW BE SAID THAT COST-PLUS REGULATION HAS BECOME OUTMODED BECAUSE ECONOMIC FORCES ARE GRADUALLY PUSHING ELECTRIC UTILITIES TOWARD INCREASED COMPETITION. IN THE USA,MANY TYPES OF INCENTIVE REGULATIONS HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED. IN GENERAL,US-STYLE INCENTIVE REGULATION CAN BE DESCRIBED AS CONSISTING OF A COST-PLUS REGULATION-BASED FRAMEWORK,WITH INCENTIVE SCHEMES APPLIED SUPPLEMENTARILY TO CERTAIN UTILITY FUNCTIONS. THE EFFECT ON PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT IS THEREFORE REGARDED AS MARGINAL. RECENT EXPERIENCE WITH PERFORMANCE-BASED REGULATION(PBR) IN CALIFORNIA SUGGESTS THAT STRONGER INCENTIVES TO IMPROVE EFFICIENCY ARE CREATED BY:(1) MAKING RATES INDEPENDENT OF COSTS;(2) LENGTHENING THE TIME BETWEEN GENERAL RATE REVIEWS;AND (3) SHARING COST SAVINGS BETWEEN CUSTOMERS AND SHAREHOLDERS. PRICE-CAP REGULATION,WHICH IS USED BY UK UTILITIES,IS ALSO STRUCTURED TO SEPARATE RATES FROM COSTS AND TO LENGTHEN THE REGULATORY LAG. IN THEORY,THIS MECHANISM GIVES THE UTILITY INCENTIVE TO AGGRESSIVELY REDUCE COSTS,BECAUSE IT KNOWS BEFOREHAND THAT IT WILL PERMANENTLY RETAIN A SHARE OF THE SAVINGS BETWEEN GENERAL RATE CASES. IN PRACTICE,HOWEVER,PRICE CAP REGULATION TENDS TO PRODUCE THE SAME EFFECTS AS RATE-OF-RETURN REGULATION,BECAUSE OF REGULATORY INTERVENTION TO RESTRICT HIGH PROFITS TO CERTAIN APPROPRIATE LEVELS IN OR EVEN BEFORE SCHEDULED REVIEWS. TO AVOID EVER-EXPANDING REGULATORY INTERVENTION,IT IS NECESSARY TO INSULATE REGULATORS FROM PUBLIC PRESSURES TO PURSUE A VARIETY OF SOCIAL GOALS. BY COMBINING AN AUTOMATIC ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM SUCH AS PASS-THROUGH OR EARNINGS SHARINGS WITH PROHIBITIO

報告書年度

1995

発行年月

1996/04/01

報告者

担当氏名所属

矢島 正之

経済社会研究所経営グループ

C.Riechman

ケルン大学

キーワード

和文英文
INCENTIVE REGULATIONS

PRICE CAP REGULATIONS

ELECTRICITY SUPPLY INDUSTRY
Copyright (C) Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry