電力中央研究所 報告書(電力中央研究所報告)
報告書データベース 詳細情報
報告書番号
EY95002
タイトル(和文)
APPLICATION OF INCENTIVE REGULATIONS IN ELECTRICITY SUPPLY INDUSTRY
タイトル(英文)
APPLICATION OF INCENTIVE REGULATIONS IN ELECTRICITY SUPPLY INDUSTRY
概要 (図表や脚注は「報告書全文」に掲載しております)
*
概要 (英文)
HISTORICALLY,THE TOOL TRADITIONALLY USED BY UTILITY REGULATORS TO RESTRAIN ELECTRICITY RATES HAS BEEN COST-PLUS(RATE-OF-RETURN)REGULATION. EXPERIENCE SHOWS THAT COST-PLUS REGULATION DOESNOT NECESSARILY INDUCE EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENTS IN UTILITY OPERATIONS. IN ORDER TO IMPROVE EFFICIENCY IN NON-COMPETITIVE MARKETS,INCENTIVE MECHANISMS HAVE BEEN DESIGNED TO REPLACE TRADITIONAL COST-PLUS REGULATION.IT CAN NOW BE SAID THAT COST-PLUS REGULATION HAS BECOME OUTMODED BECAUSE ECONOMIC FORCES ARE GRADUALLY PUSHING ELECTRIC UTILITIES TOWARD INCREASED COMPETITION. IN THE USA,MANY TYPES OF INCENTIVE REGULATIONS HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED. IN GENERAL,US-STYLE INCENTIVE REGULATION CAN BE DESCRIBED AS CONSISTING OF A COST-PLUS REGULATION-BASED FRAMEWORK,WITH INCENTIVE SCHEMES APPLIED SUPPLEMENTARILY TO CERTAIN UTILITY FUNCTIONS. THE EFFECT ON PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT IS THEREFORE REGARDED AS MARGINAL. RECENT EXPERIENCE WITH PERFORMANCE-BASED REGULATION(PBR) IN CALIFORNIA SUGGESTS THAT STRONGER INCENTIVES TO IMPROVE EFFICIENCY ARE CREATED BY:(1) MAKING RATES INDEPENDENT OF COSTS;(2) LENGTHENING THE TIME BETWEEN GENERAL RATE REVIEWS;AND (3) SHARING COST SAVINGS BETWEEN CUSTOMERS AND SHAREHOLDERS. PRICE-CAP REGULATION,WHICH IS USED BY UK UTILITIES,IS ALSO STRUCTURED TO SEPARATE RATES FROM COSTS AND TO LENGTHEN THE REGULATORY LAG. IN THEORY,THIS MECHANISM GIVES THE UTILITY INCENTIVE TO AGGRESSIVELY REDUCE COSTS,BECAUSE IT KNOWS BEFOREHAND THAT IT WILL PERMANENTLY RETAIN A SHARE OF THE SAVINGS BETWEEN GENERAL RATE CASES. IN PRACTICE,HOWEVER,PRICE CAP REGULATION TENDS TO PRODUCE THE SAME EFFECTS AS RATE-OF-RETURN REGULATION,BECAUSE OF REGULATORY INTERVENTION TO RESTRICT HIGH PROFITS TO CERTAIN APPROPRIATE LEVELS IN OR EVEN BEFORE SCHEDULED REVIEWS. TO AVOID EVER-EXPANDING REGULATORY INTERVENTION,IT IS NECESSARY TO INSULATE REGULATORS FROM PUBLIC PRESSURES TO PURSUE A VARIETY OF SOCIAL GOALS. BY COMBINING AN AUTOMATIC ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM SUCH AS PASS-THROUGH OR EARNINGS SHARINGS WITH PROHIBITIO
報告書年度
1995
発行年月
1996/04/01
報告者
担当 | 氏名 | 所属 |
---|---|---|
主 |
矢島 正之 |
経済社会研究所経営グループ |
共 |
C.Riechman |
ケルン大学 |
キーワード
和文 | 英文 |
---|---|
* | INCENTIVE REGULATIONS |
PRICE CAP REGULATIONS | |
ELECTRICITY SUPPLY INDUSTRY |